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Abstract
We study how much information rms include in their advertisements and what determines
their choices. We use data from advertisement videos from the US OTC analgesics industry
between 2001 and 2005 to measure information content in ads. For each video we code the
number of cues it contains. The correlation between any two cues is rarely large, suggesting
that each cue provides di¤erent information. We nd: i) brands with inherently better
characteristics (e.g. faster relief) transmit more information; ii) comparative advertisements
contain signicantly more information than self-promotion ads; iii) market share is negatively
associated with the amount of information content; iv) a higher market share of the generic
version of a brand is also associated with less information by the brand. Not controlling for
endogeneity of market share and the decision to use comparative advertising would lead to
signicant estimation bias. Result (iii) is consistent with recent theoretical work that larger
rms disclose less information, while result (iv) indicates the likely presence of information
spillovers from brands to their generic counterparts.
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11 Introduction
How much information rms choose to disclose in advertisements is a question of substantial
theoretical and empirical debate. Recent research in marketing and economics provides some
theoretical predictions on the relationship between market structure or rm size and the amount
of information transmitted (Sun 2010; Guo and Zhao 2009; Anderson and Renault 2009). The
empirical work on the content of advertising is split into two camps with essentially no overlap -
vast numbers of content analysis articles in marketing (see Abernethy and Franke 1996 for a ne
summary) and a nascent literature in marketing and economics where advertising content is
treated as a choice variable (Bertrand et al. 2010; Anderson et al. 2010; Liaukonyte 2010). This
paper provides some relevant evidence for the theory and bridges the gap between the two
empirical camps by improving the methodology of the content analysis literature, which enables
us to study the determinants of advertising content.
We use data from the Over the Counter (OTC) Analgesics industry in the US. This
industry is noteworthy for several reasons. First, rms spend large amount of money on
advertising relative to other industries. Advertising-to-sales ratios for OTC analgesics typically
range from 20 to 30 percent of sales, making them one of the most heavily promoted
manufactured goods. Second, rms do both self-promotion and comparative advertising, so we
can investigate whether more or less information is included in each of these two types of ads.
Finally, the type of cues that are mentioned (e.g. "strong") are clearly identiable, so the coding
of the actual ads is only marginally subjective.
We classify and fully measure di¤erent types of advertising content (within this industry)
by analyzing each television commercial that was broadcast between 2001 and 2005. We code
each product characteristic mentioned in the advertisements. These data are then integrated with
data on the total amount spent to air each advertisement. The richness of the data allows us to
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propose a novel methodological technique to analyze the informational content of advertising to
weigh the distribution of information by the advertising expenditure, which is a close
approximation of consumer reach. We then merge this dataset with brand sales data in order to
determine the e¤ect of brand size on ad content. Further variables are constructed by collecting
information on the exogenous product characteristics, determined by their active ingredient and
assembled from medical research published in peer-reviewed medical journals.
Our analysis consists of three broad steps. First, we show some stylized patterns in the data
such as the distribution of cues across di¤erent types of ads (comparative and self-promotion).
We also analyze in detail the extent to which di¤erent cues are mentioned together. For example,
if product attribute "strong" is always mentioned together with "long-lasting," then we should
not necessarily think of these two cues as providing di¤erent information. However, we show that
the correlation between cues is rarely large, which supports the claim that our classication of
cues is consistent with the idea that each cue provides di¤erent information.
Second, we relate the number of cues to exogenous explanatory variables. We run ordered
probit models where the dependent variable is the number of cues and the explanatory variables
are the quantiable medical characteristics of the active ingredient of a brand, standardized so as
to indicate the strength of each brand in each characteristic relative to the other brands. Brands
with inherently higher strength of pain relief, those with faster relief, and those with a lower
potential for gastrointestinal (GI) toxicity or cardiovascular (CV) risk include more information in
their ads.
Third, various e¤ects of interest involve endogenous variables, such as the relative content
of comparative ads, the relationship between content and rm market share or generic
counterpart size. Comparative advertisements contain more information than self-promotion ads.
In particular, after accounting for the endogeneity of the decision to use comparative claims, we
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show that the probability of observing at least three cues is 73:3 percent higher in comparative
ads than in self-promotion ads. Next, we show that market share is negatively associated with
the amount of information content as larger rms put out less informative ads. This nding is
particularly interesting because, a priori, the e¤ect of rm size on information content is
ambiguous. On the one hand, rms with stronger market positions might have better quality
products, providing a lot of possible topics for advertising content. On the other hand, imparting
a lot of information can be a two-edged sword as some consumers may be turned o¤ buying if
they infer or realize that a product does not deliver their preferred characteristics. Smaller brands
may want to communicate characteristics in order to compare themselves in a favorable light to
larger and more popular brands, and they may also want to stress di¤erences. The latter theme,
in essence, is at the heart of the Anderson and Renault (2009) result that su¢ ciently small rms
want to provide information while large ones do not. But it could instead be the case that small
brands wish to deploy narrow advertising themes to target specic audiences (Iyer, Soberman and
Villas-Boas 2005; Anand and Shachar 2009), and they may not possess many favorable advantages
to highlight in their marketing activity. Finally, similarly to work by Rutz and Bucklin (2010),
which nds evidence that generic internet search activity positively a¤ects branded search activity
via increased awareness, we also nd evidence of similar spillover e¤ect. We nd that a higher
market share of the generic version (e.g. ibuprofen) of a brand (e.g. Advil) is also associated with
less information by the brand (Advil). This nding constitutes evidence that brands are
concerned about spillover e¤ects that would benet their generic competitors, and that these
spillovers are larger for more informative ads. Instead, the branded rm might concentrate its
advertising strategy less on drug performance and more on promoting the brand per se.
Our paper is related to the literature on content analysis, which also counts the number of
cues (pieces of information) included in advertisements and argues that more information is
4
provided by ads with more cues. This approach, initially advocated by Resnik and Stern (1977)
has been applied in more than 60 studies to measure the information content of advertising in
di¤erent media (Chou, Franke, and Wilcox 1987; Harmon, Razzouk, and Stern 1983; Stern and
Resnik 1991), countries (Madden, Caballero, and Matsukubo 1986; Hong, Muderrisoglu, and
Zinkhan 1987), and product categories (Stern, Krugman, and Resnik 1981).1 While the
Resnik-Stern approach has been used extensively, results have varied markedly, even within the
same medium, because of lack of a multivariate statistical analysis, redundant denitions of
information cues, and small sample size (Abernethy and Franke 1996). We analyze a single
industry, which enables us to deal with most of these criticisms. First, we can consistently set
product attribute categories that are specic to the industry. Second, our sample size is relatively
large and fully inclusive. Finally, to avoid the bias that is caused by analyzing only each distinct
advertisement or a sample subset, we weight our results by the advertising expenditures on each
ad and use all ads produced.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents the
classical content analysis. Section 4 introduces the ordinal statistical models that we use for our
multivariate analysis. Section 5 investigates the relationship between information content and the
decision to make a comparative ad. In this Section we also relate market share of the brand and
of its generic competitor to information content. Section 6 summarizes, notes limitations of our
approach, and discusses future research opportunities in advertising content.
2 Data Description
We use two main datasets. We present the advertising dataset rst to give a sense of what
information brands choose to communicate to their consumers about their products. Then we
present a dataset on the characteristics of the active ingredient of the brands. The characteristics
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are exogenous and in our empirical analysis we will use them as explanatory variables of the
amount of information released by the rms. We will also use these characteristics to construct
instrumental variables.
2.1 Advertising Dataset
The OTC analgesics market covers pain-relief medications with four major active chemical
ingredients. These are aspirin, acetaminophen, ibuprofen, and naproxen sodium. The nationally
advertised brands are familiar names: Tylenol (acetaminophen), Advil and Motrin (ibuprofen),
Aleve (naproxen sodium), Bayer (aspirin or combination), and Excedrin (acetaminophen or
combination).
The advertising data come from TNS-Media Intelligence and cover the entire OTC
analgesics product category in the U.S. The data set contains video les of all advertisements, as
well as monthly advertising expenditures by ad, for 2001-2005 for each product advertised in the
OTC analgesics category. While the advertising numbers also include expenditures on other
media, almost all (around 90%) of the advertising budgets were spent on broadcast television
advertising, including network and cable TV. In the analysis below, we only look at the TV ad
data.
We watched 4503 individual commercials broadcast during 2001-2005, 346 of which had
missing video les. Each individual ad was usually shown multiple times. The total number of
times these commercials were shown over the 5-year period in all types of media was a staggering
466,413 times. For each ad we recorded whether the commercial had any comparative claims, and
if a commercial was comparative, what was the comparative claim (e.g. faster, stronger, etc.). If
the advertisement was not comparative, then we recorded any claim (e.g. safety, strength, speed,
etc.) that was made. In a related paper, Anderson, Ciliberto, Liaukonyte and Renault (2010)
construct and estimate a structural model of comparative advertising and target brand choice.
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We do not use the information on which brand was targeted here because this is not the focus of
this paper.
We coded claims into characteristics, according to the purpose of the drug (menstrual,
arthritis, headache, etc.), e¢ ciency and/or safety (safety, strength, speed, etc.) of the drug, and
other characteristics (non-habit forming, overdose warning, etc.).
In total there are thirty product attributes, but, for the sake of clarity, Figure 1 includes
only the top 23 attributes and shows how many millions of dollars brands spent advertising the
top product attributes over ve years, ranked by dollars spent. The dollar expenditures given are
for the full sample. If an ad mentioned a characteristic, we count the spending on that ad as
spending on that characteristic. This means that the sum of the expenditures in Figure 1
exceeds the total ad spending because many ads promote multiple characteristics. The ad
spending is broken down into whether the ad was categorized as comparative or not. The
remaining 7 attributes had negligible advertising expenditures.
The attributes "Fast", "Strong", "Long Lasting" and "Safe and/or Trusted" are among the
top ve most heavily advertised attributes. These attributes are directly related to the inherent
(exogenous) chemical characteristics of each active ingredient in each analyzed brand, which we
discuss in great detail in the next section.
Table 1 portrays the correlation matrix of cue usage. We look at the correlations to
investigate whether the cues chosen represent distinct information or not. For example, we have
coded "strong" and "fast" as separate categories, but we need to make sure that the information
categories we have coded are indeed distinct information cues. Table 1 shows that the cue
descriptors we use are indeed quite distinctive. For example, even though "Fast" and "Strong"
are often used together, in over half the occurrences (in dollar terms) they are also used
separately.2 Thus, two cues may be used together frequently, but each still gives extra
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information. Strong denotes how powerful is the medicine when it is in e¤ect, Fast denotes speed
of the onset of pain relief. Of course, the active ingredient present in each drug may have both of
these properties. Our take-away from Table 1 is that the classication we use does describe
independent information cues.
Table 2 compiles spending and cue information by brand and by year.3 The rst two
columns reect the (expenditure weighted) average number of attributes and likelihood of any
observation to be a comparative ad, reported by brand. Aleve and Advil ads mention on average
one more attribute than Tylenol, Motrin, and Excedrin ads, and approximately half an attribute
more than Bayer ads. Furthermore, almost half the ad spending was on comparative ads: we will
pay special attention to the di¤erence in advertising content according to whether or not an ad
was comparative. The breakdown is striking across brands: almost all of Aleves ads are
comparative ads; two thirds of Advils ads are comparative. The others have around one third of
their ads comparative, with the exception of Excedrin which has just one sixth. Column 3 in
Table 2 gives the average dollars spent per ad creative, averaged over the ads aired in a month.
Excedrin spent the most per ad per month, with an average of $255,000. Other brands spent
between $100,000 and $140,000. These numbers reect Excedrins reliance on a relatively small
number of ads in their portfolio at any one time. Even though Excedrin spends more per ad in
any month, it ranks only third in overall advertising spending. During the 5 year period
analyzed, Tylenol spent by far the most on advertising, $414 million, constituting some 32% of
the (dollar weighted) observations. Advil spent around a third less, and the other four spent each
roughly half of that amount. The average monthly sales (averaged across rms) are around 23
million dollars.
The advertising to sales ratios are very high in this industry: we can see from the last
Column of Table 2 that they range from 17.8% for Tylenol to 28.8% for Bayer. Table 2 also
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indicates that advertising-to-sales-ratios across the industry increased slightly to its peak in 2004
when both OTC and prescription analgesics were faced with several adverse e¤ects, such as the
Vioxx withdrawal and Aleves association with elevated cardiovascular risk.
2.2 Characteristics Dataset
Our analysis also incorporates data on strength pain relief, relative e¢ ciency and safety for each
brand. This information was collected from peer-reviewed medical journals. Although each of the
drugs generally treat pain, fevers and headaches (hence implying that they are close substitutes),
there are some di¤erences between analgesic types. While aspirin, naproxen sodium and ibuprofen
are non-steroidal anti-inammatory drugs (NSAIDs), Acetaminophen is not. In general, ibuprofen
and naproxen are more potent pain relievers, i.e., they reduce more pain than the corresponding
dose of Acetaminophen or Aspirin. On the other hand, Acetaminophen is considered to be the
safest pain reliever because it does not block prostaglandins, and therefore does not cause any
gastrointestinal (GI) bleeding. However, even though Acetaminophen reduces pain and fever, it
does nothing for inammation. Additionally, high doses of Acetaminothen may damage the liver.
Aspirin is the only pain reliever shown to reduce the risk of heart attack (albeit in low doses).
We can quantify or rank all the true characteristics that were used in advertising associated
with each active ingredient as follows. First, we interpret "fast" as the time taken to achieve a
perceptible or meaningful pain relief (in medical literature terminology: onset to perceptible pain
relief). Second, such claims as "long lasting" are interpreted as a duration of meaningful pain
relief. Third, we interpret claims concerning strength (e.g. "strong", "stronger", "tougher on
pain") as the maximum level of pain relief achieved and we use NNT (Number Needed to Treat)
measure to approximate analgesic e¢ ciency claims. NNT is a standard e¢ ciency measure used in
the pain relief evaluation literature. See Appendix B for an explanation of how NNT, CV and GI
risks are calculated.
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The medical literature provides objective risk and e¢ ciency measures for each product,
based on its active ingredient (or combination of ingredients), strength and recommended dosage.
There are denitive maximum doses and durations of therapy for each active ingredient.
Di¤erences exist across di¤erent active ingredients in terms of the important safety issue of the
potential for gastrointestinal (GI) toxicity and cardiovascular (CV) risk. The measurable
characteristics were collected for maximum OTC recommended dosage (single dose): Ibuprofen 
400mg; Naproxen Sodium - 440 mg.; Aspirin 1000mg; ACT 1000mg. These measurements
enable us to identify the locations of all the products in the characteristics space.
Now we turn to discussing in greater detail the measurable product characteristics and
characteristics that can be unambiguously ranked. The measurable characteristics are the
Numbers Needed to Treat, Cardiovascular Risk and Gastrointestinal Risk. Figure 4 depicts
quantiable active ingredient attribute positions in characteristics space.
In addition to using absolute risk and e¢ cacy measures, we supplement our data with
relative performance metric for speed of pain relief.4 Each active ingredient can be unambiguously
ranked by the onset of pain relief (i.e. "Fast") using the results in published medical studies.5
Figure 2 clearly exhibits the fact that no active ingredient is superior in all characteristics.
Clinically, all four main active ingredients have varying degrees of side e¤ects. Because people
react to each ingredient di¤erently, clinical pain researchers are hesitant to assign superiority to
any single drug. Each active ingredient has a comparative advantage. Aspirin (brand name:
Bayer) is weak (high NNT) but it has low, almost non-existent cardiovascular risk. Naproxen
sodium (Aleve) has lowest NNT (which implies that it is the most potent drug) but is associated
with very high GI risk. Acetaminophen (Tylenol and Excedrin) has low GI risk, but is weak in
pain relief and has a medium cardiovascular risk. Ibuprofen (Advil and Motrin) and Naproxen
Sodium (Aleve) based brands have highest CV risk but are also the fastest in pain relief. The
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longevity measure is inversely related to the maximum number of regular strength pills allowed to
be taken within 24 hours. Naproxen Sodium (Aleve) tops the list in this regard, whereas
Acetaminophen (Excedrin and Tylenol) have the lowest duration of pain relief. Therefore the
informational content of advertising is very important as it helps consumers to be better matched
to a particular drug with a particular active ingredient.
3 Content Analysis
3.1 Univariate Histograms
The classic Content Analysis compiles the distribution of numbers of information cues. With our
elaborate data set, which includes how many times an ad was aired, and how much was spent on
doing so, we can compare di¤erent ways of counting observations. These are compared in Figure
3a.
The numbers on the horizontal axis are the number of information cues in an ad, and the
vertical axis is the relative frequency in the sample. The third columns in Figure 3a treat each
unique ad as a di¤erent observation. The middle, lightest color columns, weigh each occurrence of
each ad. Finally, the darkest color columns weight each occurrence by how much was spent airing
it. Arguably, the latter is the best measure of the economic importance of each information
category and the extent of information content. However, the similarity across the di¤erent
measures is striking. This issue is discussed further in Section 4.
3.2 Comparative Advertising
Figure 3b shows the cue distribution and descriptive statistics for comparative and
noncomparative ads. These ndings are broadly consistent with the ndings of Harmon, Razzouk,
and Stern (1983) and Chou, Franke and Wilcox (1987) for magazine advertisements. Harmon,
Razzouk, and Stern (1983) nd that comparative ads on average have 1.84 cues and
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non-comparative ads have only 0.86 cues. However, we nd that, on average, each ad contains
more information than found by Harmon et al. and that the di¤erence between the number of
cues for comparative and non-comparative ads, even though statistically signicant, is much
smaller. One might expect a comparison of comparative and non-comparative ads on broadcast
TV to yield similar patterns, although perhaps at a lower level of information, since meta analysis
evidence in Abernethy and Franke (1996) suggests that television advertisements have
signicantly fewer informational cues than print media advertisements. Overall, though, we would
expect more informational cues in comparative advertisements simply because some objective
criteria should be presented to the consumer as required to comply with Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) guidelines on comparative advertising. Additionally, the prior analysis of
quantifying information content in comparative vs. noncomparative ads might be misleading due
to endogeneity problem, which we explain in Section 5.2.
4 Multivariate Analysis with Ordered Probits
The classic content analysis determines the fraction of ads for each given number of cues and uses
univariate histograms to compare scenarios. In this paper, we use an ordered probit model to
study the determinants of the distribution of cues.6
Providing too little information arguably wastes the opportunity of convincing prospective
consumers su¢ ciently. Providing too much may cause crowding of the messages of the ad and
may cause information overload for the consumer. This suggests an optimal degree of information
content. The optimal degree may vary systematically across rms and may be partially explained
by observable factors, such as rm size. It may also vary across messages from the same rm
according to the suitability of various combinations of information, recent news about the
product, and the medium (or TV show) in which the ad is placed these are the factors a¤ecting
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choice which are unobservable (to the econometrician).
We use a discrete measure of content (number of cues) and describe outcomes as integer
values. Loosely, think of an optimal number of cues as a random variable with a systematic
component which di¤ers across rms and can be in turn explained by observable features. The
ordered probit model assumes that unobserved components are drawn from a normal distribution
and determines cut-o¤ values such that the realization of a latent variable (explained component
plus noise) lies within a range corresponding to each specic number of cues.
4.1 Information Content in an Ordered Probit Model
Let y denote the number of cues included in an ad where y takes the values f0; 1; 2; :::; Jg. In our
sample J = 6 is the maximum number of characteristics observed in any ad. The ordered probit
model can be derived from a latent variable model. The latent variable, y, here the information
content, is determined by:
y = X + e,
where e has a normal distribution,  is a K  1 vector of parameters, and X is a 1K vector of
observable features of the brand, which does not include a constant. Here y = X + e can be
interpreted as describing the equilibrium choice of information content as a function of the
exogenous variables. Then more information content is associated with a larger number of cues.
This simple interpretation makes the use of ordered models an attractive framework to study
information content.
Dene 1 < 2 < ::: < J as unknown thresholds or cuto¤ points. The relationship between
the latent variable y and the observed variable y is as follows:
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y = 0 if y  1
y = 1 if 1  y  2
:::
y = J if y > J :
Assume that e is distributed according to a standard normal distribution e  N (0; 1).
Then, the probability of each outcome is:
Pr (y = 0jX) =  (1  X)
Pr (y = 1jX) =  (2  X)   (1  X)
:::
Pr (y = J jX) = 1   (J  X) :
The parameters 1; :::; J and  can be estimated using maximum likelihood. The marginal
e¤ect for a change in w is given as follows:
@ Pr (y = j)
@w
=



j  X   w   v
v
v

  

j 1  X   w   v
v
v

( ) :
Notice that there are as many marginal e¤ects as outcomes. Moreover, the marginal e¤ects
do not have the same sign across outcomes. If  is positive, then a higher w means that the rst
outcome (j = 0) is less likely to occur while the last outcome, (e.g. j = 6) is more likely to occur.
The sign of the e¤ect for the intermediate outcomes is ambiguous.
4.2 Heterogeneity in Information Cues
We start our analysis of explaining the pattern of information cues by rst by breaking down the
ads by identity of the advertiser and by year. Then we look at how information content is related
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to the exogenous characteristics of the active ingredients of each brand. Essentially we take the
view that medical properties of the underlying Active Ingredient molecules inuence the
information content of an advertisers series of ads, and we break down the information with this
explanatory variable. Our rst step consists of showing how using an ordered probit without any
additional control variables can improve on the classic univariate content analysis.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 report the results when we do not include any control
variables in the estimation. Thus, we only estimate the cuto¤s. In Column 2 we weight each ad
by the advertising expenditure in that ad whereas in Column 1 we report the results from the
unweighted regression. Recall that the classic content analysis does not weigh ad observations by
advertising expenditure.7 As discussed in Section 2, two appealing features of our data are that
we have the complete set of ads run over the sample period, and we have the expenditure data on
each ad. Many traditional studies do not have the data on what was paid to screen, air, or
publish ads, so they are constrained to just report information cues per ad analyzed.
The standard errors of the cuto¤s in Columns 1 and 2 are small because of the large
sample size: all the cuto¤s are precisely estimated. The rst cuto¤ is very small, reecting that
very few ads have no information content. The cuto¤s in Columns 1 and 2 are not much
di¤erent, but they are statistically di¤erent.8 The cut-points are all slightly larger when the ads
are not expenditure-weighted. This means that the probability of seeing a number of cues below
any particular number is higher when the data are unweighted.
One way to visualize this is to think of the given normal distribution and the cut-points
being to the right for the unweighted case. An alternative visualization is in terms of the
cumulative number of cues, which is larger for the unweighted case. We can therefore say that the
distribution of cues for the unweighted data stochastically rst-order dominates the distribution
for the weighted data there is a greater fraction of ads with zero cues, a greater fraction with
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one or fewer, etc. This implies that more money tends to be spent on running ads with more cues
in them. As a benchmark, if all ads cost the same amount to screen, then ads with more cues are
being screened more often. Alternatively, if they were all aired the same number of times, those
with more cues are being aired to more expensive (i.e., typically larger) audiences.
However, as we mentioned above, the di¤erence in the cuto¤s estimated in Columns 1 and
2, while statistically signicant, is small. This indicates that a lack of data on the amount spent
on airing the ads does not distort the results much for our particular sample. For example, in an
industry with a lot of seasonality within a month, the results might be quite di¤erent.
In the sequel, we only provide the results for the expenditure-weighted case.
4.3 Brand and Time Fixed E¤ects
We add brand xed e¤ects to see which brands choose to provide more information cues, and we
add year xed e¤ects to see whether the information pattern across the analyzed years is
di¤erent. The results are reported in Columns 3-5 of Table 3, . Notice that the number of
brands (six) does not change over time, while the number of observations for each brand increases
each year-month. This explains why we are not concerned about the incidental parameters
problem (Heckman 1981).
The brand "Tylenol" and year "2001" xed e¤ects are used as a base and therefore omitted.
The results reported in Column 3 of Table 3 suggest that only Excedrin advertises fewer cues
than Tylenol (the negative entry in the Column), but not signicantly less. Below we further
explore the relation between the fundamental active ingredients and cues, using performance
measures for the Active Ingredients. Motrin provides only slightly more cues than Tylenol. Aleve
ranks the highest in terms of average number of cues used in ads, Advil is a close second. Both of
these brands engage in a lot of comparative advertising, which is the focus of analysis in Section
(5.3) where we trace how much incremental information is driven by comparative advertising.
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Columns 4 and 5 add year xed e¤ects. Comparing to 2001 (which is the omitted xed
e¤ect), the information patterns in 2002 and 2003 are not noticeably di¤erent. However, ads aired
during 2004 have slightly fewer cues, whereas ads aired in 2005 have signicantly more. The rise
of information content during the year 2005 is most likely related to the FDAs announcement at
the end of 2004 of the results of a clinical study, which indicated that patients taking naproxen
sodium (Aleve) may be at an increased risk of su¤ering heart attack or stroke (the withdrawal of
Vioxx was also associated with this clinical study). By the end of January 2005, sales of Aleve
plummeted by over 50% su¤ering the largest decline in brand history (for more details, see Aleve
Case History, Real People Campaign (2006)).
The source of increased information content in 2005 most likely comes either from Aleve
trying to re-establish its position by providing more information that its risk was exaggerated, or
by competitors trying to compare themselves directly or indirectly to Aleve, and reminding
consumers that the risk of their brand is lower. 9 We explore the heterogeneity of information
changes across brands in 2005 by constructing a variable that interacts the xed e¤ect of 2005
with brand xed e¤ect (Tylenol  2005 is omitted). The results of this estimation are reported in
Column 5. Even after controlling for the mean information content in 2005, we see that Aleve
changed its advertising strategy the most, which resulted in the highest increase of informational
content. Tylenol, Excedrin and Motrin also exhibited the increased pattern in advertising
content, whereas Advils reaction was in the opposite direction.
To summarize the results of Table 3, there is substantial heterogeneity in the degree of ad
informativeness across brands. However the variation across time is not signicant, with the
exception of year 2005, which was a turbulent year for the entire analgesics category.
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4.4 Exogenous Determinants of Information Cues
Finally, we look at how information content is associated with the exogenous medical
characteristics of the active ingredients. Column 6 of Table 3 includes NNT, Relative Speed,
CV and GI Risk measures.
We nd that brands with inherently higher strength of pain relief (lower NNT) have ads
with higher information content. Recall rst that for Numbers Needed to Treat (NNT), a higher
number means worse performance and a less e¤ective drug. So the negative coe¢ cient on NNT is
consistent with strong and e¢ cient drugs putting more information in their ads. A similar
pattern holds for brands that have lower GI and CV risks: their ads also tend to be more
informative. Finally, brands that o¤er faster relief also have higher information content.
Overall, Column 3 of Table 5 suggests that more information is transmitted the stronger
is a brand along one of the four dimensions identied by the exogenous medical characteristics of
the active ingredient.
5 Comparative Advertising, Sales, and Information Disclosure
In this Section we look at the relationship between endogenous explanatory variables and
information content. We consider three endogenous variables. First, we investigate whether
comparative ads contain more information content than self-promotion ads. Next, we study how
brand size is associated with information content. Finally, we study whether spillover e¤ects,
whereby a brand is concerned about ads that might benet its generic competitor, play an
important role in determining the information content of an ad. We rst explain the instrumental
variable approach in the current context.
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5.1 Identication
In Sections (4.2), (4.3), and (4.4) we studied how exogenous variables are associated with the
amount of information content in advertisements. Since all the regressors are exogenous, we could
run a standard ordered probit. Below we study whether comparative ads contain more
information and whether the amount of information released is a function of the market share of a
brand (e.g. Tylenol) and of the market share of its generic competitors (e.g. analgesics whose
active ingredient is ACT). Because the decision to include a comparative statement is made by
the rm at the same time that the rm decides how much information to release in an ad, this
raises serious endogeneity concerns. Similarly, a brands market share is likely determined, at
least in part, by its location in the characteristics space. We show that the amount of information
released is a function of a brands characteristics. This also raises serious endogeneity concerns.
If endogeneity is important and is not controlled for then we can end up with biased estimates of
the relationship between the endogenous variables (comparative ads and sales) and the outcome
(information content).
We use an instrumental variable approach to see whether our endogeneity concerns are
empirically relevant. Instruments that are correlated with sales and advertising, but not correlated
with an unobserved quality, provide information on how important the endogeneity problem is.
Following the literature on the estimation of demand in di¤erentiated product markets (e.g.
Bresnahan 1987), we assume that the product characteristics space is exogenous. This is a very
reasonable assumption in this industry, since the "true" characteristics of pain relievers are
essentially xed, determined by the chemical properties of the particular active ingredient that
constitutes the drug. Recall that the exogenous product characteristics (described in Section 2.2)
are the NNT value, relative speed, CV risk and GI risk.
Then, we consider the case when a brands own characteristics enter directly in the ordered
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probit regression and the instrumental variables are constructed using functions (here, the
average) of the characteristics of the brands competitors. This follows the standard approach in
the empirical industrial organization literature. More specically, we construct the means of the
characteristics of the brands competitors as well as the minimum values of them. We also
interact these characteristics with a dummy that is equal to 1 a brand has the parent company
shared by other brand, which is the case for Tylenol and Motrin (parent company McNeil), as
well as for Aleve and Bayer (parent company Bayer). Finally, we interact the characteristics with
the 2005 year dummy to capture advertising content changes during the turbulent year.
5.2 The Econometric Approach
To deal with endogenous variables in our nonlinear ordered probit model we follow the approach
proposed by Rivers and Vuong (1988). First, rewrite the information content y as:
y = X + w + ,
where w (e.g. market share) is an endogenous variables: E (w0) 6= 0. For now we consider the
case where w consists of only one endogenous variable. Later, we consider the case where there
are up to three endogenous variables on the right hand side.
The main identication assumption is that there exists a matrix of variables Z (which
contains X) such that E (Z 0) = 0. Here Z includes all the exogenous variables, such as X and
functions (here, the average) of the characteristics of the brands competitors. Let
w = Z + v;
which tells us how the variation in the endogenous variable w is explained by the variation in the
exogenous variables Z (e.g., appropriate summary statistics of the characteristics of a brands
competitors). We assume that (v; ; Z) are i.i.d., and v and  have, conditional on Z, a joint
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normal distribution: 

v

 N

0
0

;

1 vv
vv 
2
v

We can then use a basic property of jointly normal random variables and write:
E (jv) = v

v
v =
v
v
v:
Let the error e be dened as:
e =   E (jv) =   v
v
v:
Then, e  N  0; 1  2v, and
y = X + w +
v
v
v + e:
If we observed v, then we could run again a standard ordered probit model because the inclusion
of v controls for the endogeneity of w. We would only have to pay extra attention to how to
interpret the estimated parameters. Then, we would have:
Pr (y = jjX) =   j  X   w   v    j 1;  X   w   v ;
where each parameter has been rescaled: j = j=
p
1  2v,  = =
p
1  2v,  = =
p
1  2v
and  =

v
v

=
p
1  2v:
Yet, v is not observed: it is the omitted variable that generates the endogeneity problem.
The idea of Rivers and Vuong (1988) is to follow a two-step procedure. First run the OLS
regression w = Z + v. This yields residuals v^, which are plugged into the ordered probit above.
The estimation of this ordered probit has been shows to provide consistent estimates of all the
parameters.10
This approach is straightforward when there is only one endogenous regressor on the right
hand side. When there is more than one, then the analysis becomes much more cumbersome and
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to recover the original parameters of the information content relationship (e.g. ) is very di¢ cult.
Appendix C illustrates the di¢ culty with an example.
The crucial observation here is that we are not interested as much in the parameters of the
information content relationship (e.g. ), but rather in the marginal e¤ects of a change in the
endogenous variables. Then, following Blundell and Powell (2003), we can consistently estimate
the average structural function,
dASF (X;w) = N 1 NX
i=1


^j  Xi^   wi^   ^v^i

  

^j  Xi^   wi^   ^v^i

;
which then can be used to rescale the coe¢ cient of the variable whose marginal e¤ect we are
interested in. For example, to get the marginal e¤ect of a change in w, we multiply dASF (X;w)
by ^.
5.3 Comparative Advertising
As illustrated in Section (3.2), brands use comparative ads extensively. The question we want to
address now is whether more information is contained in comparative ads than in self-promotion
ads. This seems to be suggested by the frequency distribution in Figure 3b. Notice that
comparative ads will always have at least one cue, since a brand must be comparing itself to
another brand along at least one dimension. So, the analysis will look at whether comparative
and self-promotion ads are di¤erent, conditional on having at least one information cue.
Table 4 presents ordered probit results of advertising content as a function of whether an
ad was comparative or not. Columns 1-3 treat the choice of comparative ad as an exogenous
variable. Columns 4-6 treat the choice as an endogenous variable.
Column 1 shows that the comparative ad dummy is highly statistically signicant, and its
positive value (0:843) indicates that cut-points are lower for comparative ads: 0:843 is to be
subtracted from the cut-o¤ values for comparative ads. One can visualize this in two ways. First,
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given the distribution function and the set of cut-o¤s for the non-comparative ads, the cut-o¤s for
comparative ads are shifted uniformly lower. Alternatively, we can visualize leaving the cut-o¤s
the same, and shifting the distribution right for comparative ads. The latter thought experiment
makes it clear that the non-comparative ad distribution rst-order stochastically dominates the
comparative ad one. It always lies above, meaning that there is stochastically more information 
and a signicant amount in the comparative ads. The simple summary is that comparative ads
have more informational cues. Put from the opposite perspective, the likelihood that the ad is
comparative increases with the number of cues.
We compute the marginal e¤ects for comparative ads using the result in Column 1. The
marginal e¤ects are reported in Table 5. In particular, the rst row shows that when an ad has
comparative content, then it is 14:4 percent less likely to include only one cue and 4:7 percent
more likely to include six cues. The other numbers are interpreted in the same fashion. For
example, if an ad has comparative content, then it is 13:9 percent more likely to include ve cues.
Overall, we nd evidence that comparative ads do include more content and the magnitude of the
di¤erence is economically signicant.
Column 2 includes the exogenous medical characteristics, in addition to the comparative
ad dummy. To illustrate why we do this, suppose that Aleve was intrinsically both more likely to
use more cues, and more likely to use comparative advertising (we treat the comparative
advertising decision here as exogenous later we consider endogeneity of this choice). Then we
might be attributing to comparative advertising what might more strictly be properly attributed
to an Aleve e¤ect. Indeed, we nd that the parameter on the comparative ad dummy is down to
0:559 from 0:843. Thus, after controlling for the exogenous characteristics, the di¤erence in
information content is smaller. In particular, if we take the marginal e¤ects, we observe that now
comparative ads are 10:3 percent less likely than self-promotion ads are to include only one cue,
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while we had found this di¤erence to be 14:4 less likely when not including the exogenous
characteristics. Comparative ads are 10:7 more likely to have ve cues while without exogenous
characteristics they were 13:9 percent more likely. Overall, adding exogenous characteristics make
a considerable di¤erence and provides a rst piece of evidence that omitting them could lead to
biased estimates of how much more information comparative ads really contain.
Column 3 includes brand dummies, and the results are pretty much the same as in
Column 2. This is not surprising, since the exogenous characteristics do not change over time,
and are largely explained by the brand dummies. More generally, including brand dummies is as
e¤ective as including the (time constant) exogenous characteristics that di¤erentiate brands.
The next three columns allow for the comparative ad dummy to be endogenous. Following
a suggestion made by Angrist (2001), we run a linear probability model in the rst stage, and
then treat the case of this discrete variable as we illustrated in Section (5.1). It is a very di¢ cult
problem to allow for endogenous discrete variables (i.e., the comparative ad decision) in a
nonlinear model (i.e., the ordered probit). As explained by Imbens and Woolridge (2007), the
Rivers and Vuong (1988) approach illustrated above does not produce consistent estimates of the
parameters for discrete endogenous explanatory variables.
Column 4 shows the results when we instrument for the comparative ad dummy and we
do not include any control variable. The results are truly striking. We nd that comparative ads
have much more information content than self-promotion ads. Table 5 shows the marginal e¤ects
for this specication. The probability of containing only one cue is now 33:7 percent less likely in
comparative ads than in self-promotion ads. Recall that we estimated the di¤erence to be equal
to 14:4 percent in Column 1, suggesting that the bias introduced by the endogeneity of the
comparative advertising choice is very large. Similarly, we nd that the probability of observing
two cues is 43:4 less likely in comparative ads than in self-promotion ads. Overall, the probability
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of observing at least three cues is 73:3 percent higher in comparative ads than in self-promotion
ads.
The strong endogeneity of the dummy variable "Comparative?" is conrmed by the
estimated coe¢ cient of the control function, here equal to  1:450. The coe¢ cient is statistically
very signicant, which means that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the variable
"Comparative?" is endogenous (Smith and Blundell 1986).
In Column 5 we add the brands exogenous medical characteristics as regressors. Now the
parameter estimate for the comparative dummy is even higher, at 2:115.
Overall, the key nding in Table 4 is that comparative ads contain much more information
than self-promotion ads. Moreover, we nd evidence of a strong endogeneity bias in the parameter
estimate of the comparative ad dummy if we do not use an instrumental variable approach.
5.4 Sales and Comparative Advertising
In this Section we study how brand market size a¤ects the amount of information in ads. There is
little theoretical literature relating the information content of advertising to rm size. The
theoretical result of most interest here is the one in Anderson and Renault 2009, who suggest that
small rms should provide more informative content relative to large rms.
In our analysis, we also include a measure of the size of the generic counterpart of the brand
for which we observe the ad. For example, we look at the generic sales of acetaminophen-based
pills when we look at the ads of Tylenol. We might suspect that there are signicant spillovers
from branded drug advertising to generic counterparts (Tylenol might worry about increasing the
demand for the generic producer acetaminophen analgesics). These spillovers will be presumably
more important the larger the market share of the generic counterpart and the larger the
informative content about the performance of the molecule. We would thus anticipate that the
information content of a brands ads would be smaller the larger the generics sales. Although we
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do not formalize this idea here, our results do uncover such a relationship in the data.
Column 1 of Table 6 presents the results for the ordered probit with just the simple
cut-o¤s, standardized sales, squared sales, and generic sales. We nd that there is a hump-shaped
relationship between brand size and information content as the linear term of sales is equal to
0:357 and the quadratic term is equal to  0:356. Thus, these results indicate that small and large
rms include less content than medium-sized rms. We do nd that branded rms include less
information content the larger is the size of their same-active-ingredient generic competitors, as
the parameter of standardized generic sales is estimated equal to  0:220. The evidence is
consistent with a relatively larger spillover e¤ect from informative advertising.
Column 2 adds the comparative ads. The results for the standardized sales and generic
sales are quite similar to those in Column 1 of this table. Moreover, the coe¢ cient estimate for
the comparative ad dummy is very close to the one in Column 1 of Table 4. We therefore
conclude that the decisions to do comparative advertising is not collinear with brand sales and
generic sales, otherwise we would have seen di¤erent coe¢ cient estimates in Columns 1 and 2.
This result is quite interesting because it suggests that the decision of doing comparative ads
might not depend in a signicant way on the market share of the attacking brand. In a related
paper (Anderson et al. 2010) we investigate the relationship between the attackers market share,
the attacked brands market share, and how much comparative advertising to do. In preliminary
ndings we show that what drives the decision to do comparative advertsements is the market
share of the attacked brand and the interaction of the shares of the attacked and of the attacking
brands.
Column 3 adds the exogenous medical characteristics. The coe¢ cient of the comparative
ad dummy is almost equal to the one in Column 3 of Table 4. The linear term of the
standardized sales is doubled, a rst indication that sales are endogenous.
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In Column 4 we follow an instrumental variable approach to estimate the e¤ect of
comparative ads, sales and generic sales on information content. The estimated coe¢ cient of
comparative ads is large, although not as much as in Column 4 of Table 4. Now there is no
evidence of a hump-shaped relationship between size and information content. The linear term is
estimated equal to 0:096 and the quadratic term is estimated equal to  0:147. Thus, size is
negatively related to information content. We also observe that the coe¢ cient estimate of the
control functions for the generic sales (0:342) and for the decision to do comparative advertising
( 1:042) are both statistically signicant, clearly proving that both variables (generic sales and
comparative ads) are endogenous. The estimated coe¢ cient of the control function for the brand
sales (0:305) is only statistically signicant at approximately a 15 percent level. This is probably
because our instrumental variables only have just enough identication power to precisely identify
three endogenous variables. Generic sales continue to be negatively related to information content,
but the parameter estimate is down to  0:082 from the value of  0:146 that we found in Column
3. Overall, we interpret this as evidence that sales are endogenous explanatory variables. This is
conrmed by the results for the coe¢ cient of two of the three control functions. The control
function for the comparative ads is equal to  1:042; the control function for generic sales is equal
to 0:342. Both of these estimates are statistically very signicant. In contrast, the control
function for sales is equal to 0:305 and is imprecisely estimated. Notice that the control function
for the standardized sales also controls for the endogeneity of the squared standardized sales.
Column 5 shows the results when we include the exogenous medical characteristics. The
results are very similar to those in Column 4.
To get a sense of the economic meaning of the results concerning size, we constructed gures
that associate the probability of choosing a given amount of information (e.g. one cue) with the
distribution of size. For example, the graph in the top left corner of Figure 5 shows that the
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likelihood of an ad including just one cue increases sharply with size. In contrast, the probability
of observing an ad with four or more cues drops with size. The marginal e¤ects in changes in size
are implicitly shown in the gure. For example, a move from the 25th percentile in the size
distribution to the 75th percentile increases the probability of seeing only one cue by 20 percent.
The marginal e¤ects for the decision to do comparative advertising are fairly close to the
ones that we derived in the previous section. For example, we now nd that the probability of
observing two cues is 32:1 less likely in comparative ads than in self-promotion ads while it was
equal to 43:2 percent when using the estimated coe¢ cients from Table 4.
6 Conclusions
The paper delivers several contributions. The rst is a deeper and wider description of
information content which combines content knowledge with industry structure and advertising
spending data. Second, we describe a methodology appropriate for dealing with information
content with multiple explanatory variables; we show how the analysis can be corrected for
endogeneity and how this alters the results. Third, we evaluate several theoretical propositions,
giving some strong takeaways: more information is disclosed by rms with higher characteristics
quality; less information is contained in popular brand advertisements. These two results are not
contradictory: the endogeneity of rm size here underscores the importance of correcting for it,
otherwise, one might expect that larger rms are also fundamentally stronger and therefore their
ads should have more information content. Correcting for endogeneity also indicates that more
competition from generics gives rise to less information transmission by branded products, which
is in line with the view that there are signicant spill-overs to informative advertising. Finally,
comparative advertisements have signicantly more information content than non-comparative
ones, and the e¤ect is much larger than is predicted without correcting for endogeneity.
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Our analysis is restrictive in a number of aspects and suggests numerous extensions, which
constitute themes for future research and for our own ongoing investigations on the theme of
information content. First, we might use sub-classication of cues (for example, into vertical cues
like "Fast" which are presumably appreciated by all consumers, and horizontal cues like
"Headache" or "Menstrual" which are desired by some, and not desired by others) and look at the
di¤erential content of the di¤erent types of cue. Second, a cue can only be deployed if product
has it, and can only be used comparatively if a product has an advantage over another product.
It would be interesting to study the amount of information advertised as a function of the total
number of cues that could feasibly advertised. Likewise, we might want to determine whether
products use comparative ads more against similar products or dissimilar ones. Third, we have
not looked at product advertising campaigns, whereby ads address a subset of themes over a
limited horizon. Fourth, we only code the objective content of advertisements as quantied
through their referencing of specic characteristics and competitors. We recognize that
advertising may persuade through channels other than pure information, and lead consumers to
act on emotional factors. However, we have not attempted to code such e¤ects. The primary
purpose of this study is to measure objective content of advertising along the lines of traditional
content analysis. Incorporating the subjective side would be an interesting aspect to explore in
further extensions. Finally, we do not address whether market provision of information is optimal
or how valuable the information is to consumers (Ippolito and Pappalardo 2002 and Pappalardo
and Ringold 2000). Our purpose here is to document and to rationalize empirical regularities
present in the data and provide measures of the fundamental key variables that can be used in
future research to answer such questions.
The current methodology can readily be applied to other product categories and industries.
It would be interesting to compare results. For example, how does advertising information
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content di¤er for experience, search, and credence products? Does the inverse relation between
rm size and information hold more broadly? Do new products provide more information? These
are questions which hold both empirical and theoretical interest.
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Notes
1Resnik and Stern (1977) proposed to categorize the information provided in the advertisement into 14 distinct
"information cues" which included price, quality, performance, components, availability, special o¤ers, taste, nutrition,
packaging, warranties, safety, independent research, company research and new ideas.
2There are, though, two instances of high correlation that merit comment. First, whenever "Liquid Gels" are
mentioned, "Fast" is almost always mentioned (although the converse is not true - a pill does not need to be in Liquid
Gel form to be fast). Second, "Long-lasting" and "Fewer Pills" are often used together. When the ad mentioned
"Long-lasting", it mentioned "Fewer Pills" 33% of the time (for a total around $100m.). Conversely, when "Fewer
Pills" was mentioned, long-lasting was mentioned 88% of the time. In this instance, we could provide an umbrella
classication encompassing the union of both, but the di¤erence in results would be minor.
3The 2001 gures include only 10 months of observations, since we do not have the corresponding sales data for
January and February of 2001. The low total ad expenditures can be partially explained by this, but the average
monthly expenditures should not be a¤ected much. Even adjusted for ination, ad expenditures have tended to
increase over time.
4See Appendix A for the method used to obtain the relative ranking of selected attributes.
5We have also found information on the relative performance on the duration of pain relief (i.e. "Long Lasting";
see appendix A for the ranking), however we exclude this metric from further multivariate analysis because it is
highly correlated with the NNT measure (corr coef = 0.94).
6See Greene (1997) and Woolridge (2001) for an introduction to ordered models.
7The unweighteddata in Figure 2 use each separate ad within any given month as an observation: in this case
the multiple airing of the same ad within the same month and total ad expenditures are ignored. This is in line
with most of the traditional Content Analysis studies: multiple copies of the same ad were typically not counted as
di¤erent observations.
8We rejected the hypothesis at the 1% condence level that the cuto¤ pairs in weighted and unweighted cases are
the same. The cuto¤s in the unweighted case are higher than in the weighted case, and the di¤erence is statistically
signicant. This suggests that more money is being spent on ads with more informational cues.
9The aggressive Good News and personal testimonials advertising campaigns were designed to demonstrate
Aleves safety and e¢ cacy in a way that would restore condence in the brand.
10Because v is a generated regressor, we need to correct the standard errors. We use a bootstraps procedure to do
that. We run 100 times the two steps using 100 di¤erent samples of the original dataset.
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Appendix A: Explanation of Medical Measures
Relative risk (RR) is the risk of an event (e.g., developing a disease) relative to exposure. Relative
risk is the ratio of the probability of the event E occurring in the exposed group versus the control
(non-exposed) group:
RR =
Pr(E j treatment)
Pr(R j control)
Relative risk is used frequently in clinical trial data, where it is used to compare the
risk of developing a disease, in people not receiving the new medical treatment (or receiving a
placebo) versus people who are receiving an established (standard of care) treatment. In the case
of GI and CV relative risk numbers used in this paper, it is used to compare the risk of
developing a side e¤ect in people receiving a drug as compared to the people who do not receive
the treatment (or receiving a placebo). Thus, a CV RR of 1.44 means that CV problems arise
with 44% higher likelihood using the drug (vs. placebo).
Number-Needed-to-Treat (NNT) is computed with respect to two treatments A and B, with
A typically a drug and B a placebo. If the probabilities PA and PB under treatments A and B,
respectively, are known, then the NNT is computed as:
NNT =
1
PB   PA
The NNT for a given therapy is simply the reciprocal of the absolute risk reduction (ARR=
PB -PA )for that treatment. For example, in hypothetical migraine study, risk decreased from PB
=0.30 without treatment with drug M to PA =0.05 with treatment with drug M, for a relative risk
of 0.17 (0.05/0.3), a relative risk reduction of 0.83 ((0.3-0.05)/0.3), and an absolute risk reduction
of 0.25 (0.3-0.05), the NNT would be 1/0.25, or 4. In concrete clinical terms, an NNT of 4 means
that you would need to treat four patients with drug M to prevent migraine from recurring in one
patient. Typically, the lower the NNT number, the more potent and e¢ cient the treatment is.
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Appendix B: Explanation of Medical Measures
We reviewed a number of medical journal articles in order to rank the three e¢ ciency measures
(maximum level of pain relief achieved, onset to perceptible pain relief and duration of meaningful
pain relief) of the analyzed active ingredients. Most medical articles compare only two or three
active ingredients. If article X said that drug A is more e¢ cient than drug B (A  B) and article
Y said that drug B is more e¢ cient than C (B  C), then we conclude by transitivity that A is
more e¢ cient than B and C (A  B  C). Below we also present the numbered list of references
that were used to infer relative rankings. Table 7 lists all those relative relationships, references
of medical articles (in parentheses), and gives the resulting ranking presented in Figure 2.
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Appendix C: Illustration of Probit with two Endogenous
Regressors
Suppose that there are two endogenous regressors:
y = X + w + ;
with
w1 = 1Z1 + v1;
w2 = 2Z2 + v2:
Assume:
(; v1; v2)  N
0@0; 2 11 2211 21 1212
22 1212 
2
2
1A :
Then, after some tedious algebra, we can show that:
var () = 2u +
"
(1u   122u) 
1  212
 u#2 + "(2u   121u) 
1  212
 u#2   2(1u   122u) 
1  212
 2u1u
 2(2u   121u) 
1  212
 2u2u + 2(1u   122u) 1  212 (2u   121u) 1  212 2u12:
Clearly it would be very hard to recover the original parameters.
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Figures and Tables
FIGURE 1. Advertised Attributes and Expenditures.
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FIGURE 2. Location of Active Ingredients in the Characteristics Space
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FIGURE 3. Distribution of Number of Cues
(a) Within an Ad
(b) By Ad Type
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FIGURE 4: Marginal efects on Information disclosure by rm size
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TABLE 1. Matrix of Frequency of Attributes that are Mentioned Together
Fast Strong
Hea d-
ache
Long
lasting Sa fe Arthri ti s
Dr.
recomm
Liquid
gels
Legs/
muscle
Gentle on
stomach Back
Fewer
pi l l s Total
Fast $251.61 $296.52 $70.25 $32.76 $23.80 $16.69 $204.55 $101.42 $66.32 $25.65 0 $613.52
49.32% 78.63% 23.22% 11.17% 8.77% 6.70% 98.90% 49.52% 56.98% 22.11% 0
Strong $251.61 $126.43 $103.37 $93.88 $123.06 $97.80 $140.66 $133.31 $45.46 $51.94 $53.01 $510.20
41.01% 33.53% 34.16% 32.02% 45.34% 39.28% 68.01% 65.10% 39.05% 44.78% 46.81%
Hea dache $296.52 $126.43 $6.22 $28.85 $11.95 $25.42 $84.88 $17.53 $24.40 $15.88 $6.22 $377.09
48.33% 24.78% 2.06% 9.84% 4.40% 10.21% 41.04% 8.56% 20.96% 13.69% 5.49%
$70.25 $103.37 $6.22 $68.50 $153.97 $83.96 $14.43 $64.17 $23.18 $44.99 $100.06 $302.56
11.45% 20.26% 1.65% 23.36% 56.73% 33.72% 6.98% 31.34% 19.91% 38.79% 88.35%
Sa fe $32.76 $93.88 $28.85 $68.50 $115.84 $77.64 $5.51 $29.96 $55.50 $39.29 $30.46 $293.20
5.34% 18.40% 7.65% 22.64% 42.68% 31.18% 2.67% 14.63% 47.68% 33.87% 26.90%
Arthri ti s $23.80 $123.06 $11.95 $153.97 $115.84 $125.59 $21.58 $18.38 $55.21 $19.22 $80.12 $271.42
3.88% 24.12% 3.17% 50.89% 39.51% 50.43% 10.43% 8.97% 47.43% 16.57% 70.75%
$16.69 $97.80 $25.42 $83.96 $77.64 $125.59 0 $23.88 $38.35 $4.71 $50.65 $249.02
2.72% 19.17% 6.74% 27.75% 26.48% 46.27% 0 11.66% 32.95% 4.06% 44.73%
$204.55 $140.66 $84.88 $14.43 $5.51 $21.58 0 $23.06 $44.74 0 0 $206.82
33.34% 27.57% 22.51% 4.77% 1.88% 7.95% 0 11.26% 38.43% 0 0
$101.42 $133.31 $17.53 $64.17 $29.96 $18.38 $23.88 $23.06 $23.06 $56.44 $7.54 $204.79
16.53% 26.13% 4.65% 21.21% 10.22% 6.77% 9.59% 11.15% 19.81% 48.66% 6.65%
$66.32 $45.46 $24.40 $23.18 $55.50 $55.21 $38.35 $44.74 $23.06 $0.88 0 $116.40
10.81% 8.91% 6.47% 7.66% 18.93% 20.34% 15.40% 21.63% 11.26% 0.76% 0
$25.65 $51.94 $15.88 $44.99 $39.29 $19.22 $4.71 0 $56.44 $0.88 $14.83 $115.98
4.18% 10.18% 4.21% 14.87% 13.40% 7.08% 1.89% 0 27.56% 0.76% 13.10%
0 $53.01 $6.22 $100.06 $30.46 $80.12 $50.65 0 $7.54 0 $14.83 $113.25
0 10.39% 1.65% 33.07% 10.39% 29.52% 20.34% 0 3.68% 0 12.79%
Back
Fewer
pi l l s
Liquid
gels
Gentle on
stomach
Long
lasting
Dr.
recomm.
Legs/
muscle
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TABLE 2. Descriptive Statistics of Information Attributes and Ad Spending
By Brand
Number Compa- Avg Monthly Average Total Total Ad
Brand of rative? Spending per Monthly Ad Sales to Sales
Cues Ad Aired Sales Spending Ratio
Advil 3.600 0.740 $0.14 $23.92 $293.1 $1,374 21.3%
(1.004) (0.441) (0.241) (1.693)
Aleve 3.770 0.900 $0.12 $11.41 $174.8 $659 26.5%
(1.156) (0.298) (0.293) (1.123)
Bayer 3.190 0.310 $0.10 $7.95 $131.2 $458 28.8%
(1.320) (0.461) (0.222) (0.964)
Excedrin 2.400 0.150 $0.26 $12.39 $182.4 $689 26.5%
(0.695) (0.359) (0.456) (1.172)
Motrin 2.610 0.370 $0.10 $8.03 $102.0 $466 21.9%
(0.937) (0.484) (0.240) (0.762)
Tylenol 2.540 0.280 $0.13 $40.59 $414.9 $2,328 17.8%
(0.957) (0.449) (0.346) (3.195)
Overall 2.990 0.460 $0.13 $22.86 $1,299.2 $5,975 21.7%
(1.143) (0.498) (0.305) (13.677)
By Year
Number Compa- Avg Monthly Average Total Total Advertising
Year of rative? Spending per Monthly Ad Sales to Sales
Cues Ad Aired Sales Spending Ratio
2001 2.954 0.426 $0.10 $24.71 $213.8 $1,114.75 19.2%
(0.899) (0.495) (0.248) (14.012)
2002 2.958 0.583 $0.12 $25.27 $235.7 $1,282.60 18.3%
(1.140) (0.493) (0.261) (14.246)
2003 2.924 0.350 $0.13 $23.24 $268.6 $1,256.95 21.4%
(1.262) (0.477) (0.269) (13.538)
2004 2.654 0.445 $0.16 $20.25 $298.5 $1,184.68 25.2%
(0.962) (0.497) (0.402) (12.623)
2005 3.482 0.498 $0.16 $20.10 $283.0 $1,136.19 24.9%
(1.207) (0.500) (0.332) (12.879)
Overall 2.995 0.459 $2.99 $22.86 $1,299.1 $5,975.17 21.7%
(1.143) (0.498) (1.150) (13.677)
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TABLE 3. Results after controlling for brand-, time- and AI xed e¤ects
Unweighted Weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Advil 1.080*** 1.098*** 1.292***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.035)
Aleve 1.264*** 1.257*** 1.145***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.041)
Bayer 0.672*** 0.674*** 0.717***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.044)
Excedrin -0.109*** -0.125*** -0.201***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.039)
Motrin 0.101** 0.130*** 0.078
(0.043) (0.043) (0.047)
2002 -0.082** -0.086**
(0.036) (0.036)
2003 0.030 0.037
(0.036) (0.036)
2004 -0.242*** -0.235***
(0.035) (0.035)
2005 0.511*** 0.583***
(0.035) (0.053)
Advil*2005 -0.802***
(0.072)
Aleve*2005 0.463***
(0.082)
Bayer*2005 -0.135
(0.093)
Excedrin*2005 0.329***
(0.085)
Motrin*2005 0.319***
(0.111)
Standardized NNT -0.724***
(0.029)
Relative Speed 0.336***
(0.041)
Standardized GI Risk -0.133***
(0.035)
Standardized CV Risk -0.151***
(0.029)
Cuto¤ (0->1 cues) -2.728*** -3.523*** -3.258*** -3.255*** -3.241*** -3.085***
(0.059) (0.184) (0.170) (0.168) (0.164) (0.194)
Cuto¤ (1->2 cues) -1.363*** -1.504*** -1.223*** -1.226*** -1.225*** -1.041***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.025) (0.035) (0.036) (0.090)
Cuto¤ (2->3 cues) -0.244*** -0.283*** 0.132*** 0.169*** 0.185*** 0.291***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.032) (0.033) (0.089)
Cuto¤ (3->4 cues) 0.594*** 0.436*** 0.969*** 1.036*** 1.064*** 1.095***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.022) (0.032) (0.034) (0.090)
Cuto¤ (4->5 cues) 1.444*** 1.266*** 1.938*** 2.032*** 2.086*** 2.032***
(0.019) (0.017) (0.027) (0.037) (0.038) (0.091)
Cuto¤ (5->6 cues) 2.352*** 2.149*** 2.954*** 3.122*** 3.217*** 3.034***
(0.039) (0.032) (0.041) (0.051) (0.053) (0.097)
Log-Likelihood: -14594.2 -14782.5 -13601.4 -13157.2 -13157.2 -13848
N of Observations 9,739 9,739 9,739 9,739 9,739 9,739
note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Brand "Tylenol" and Year "2001" xed e¤ects are used as a
base and therefore omitted.
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TABLE 4. Results after Controlling for Comparative Advertising
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Comparative? 0.843*** 0.559*** 0.473*** 1.906*** 2.115***
(0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.130) (0.367)
Advil 0.887***
(0.032)
Aleve 1.004***
(0.039)
Bayer 0.673***
(0.039)
Excedrin -0.050
(0.035)
Motrin 0.052
(0.043)
Standardized NNT -0.602*** -0.220*
(0.029) (0.128)
Relative Speed 0.281*** 0.111
(0.041) (0.121)
Standardized GI Risk -0.132*** -0.134
(0.035) (0.095)
Standardized CV Risk -0.185*** -0.274***
(0.029) (0.084)
Residuals-Comparative -1.450*** -1.652***
(0.146) (0.364)
Cuto¤ (1->2 cues) -1.251*** -0.941*** -1.121*** -0.837*** -0.569**
(0.021) (0.091) (0.025) (0.075) (0.237)
Cuto¤ (2->3 cues) 0.078*** 0.436*** 0.270*** 0.538*** 0.823***
(0.016) (0.090) (0.022) (0.064) (0.243)
Cuto¤ (3->4 cues) 0.871*** 1.271*** 1.128*** 1.382*** 1.677***
(0.018) (0.090) (0.023) (0.072) (0.251)
Cuto¤ (4->5 cues) 1.762*** 2.228*** 2.110*** 2.324*** 2.647***
(0.022) (0.092) (0.029) (0.079) (0.257)
Cuto¤ (5->6 cues) 2.694*** 3.234*** 3.129*** 3.334*** 3.670***
(0.036) (0.097) (0.042) (0.118) (0.274)
Log-Likelihood: -13990.3 -13527.6 -13359.9 -13670.0 -13525.0
N of Observations 9,708 9,708 9,708 9,708 9,708
note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Brand "Tylenol" xed e¤ect is used as a base
and therefore omitted. Columns (4) and (5) treat "Comparative?" as an endogenous
variable and instruments it with the following exogenous variables: Mean Std NNT,
Mean Std GI Risk, Mean Relative Speed, Mean Std CV Risk, Min Std. CV Risk,
Min Std. GI Risk,attribute interactions with year 2005 dummy and with the dummy
indicating whether a brand has the parent company shared by other brand.
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TABLE 5. Results of Table 4 Marginal E¤ects
Marginal e¤ects (by number of cues)
Variable: 1 2 3 4 5 6
Exogenous Treatment (Table 4 Column 1)
Comparative? -0.144*** -0.188*** 0.007 0.134*** 0.139*** 0.047**
(0.032) (0.013) (0.095) (0.021) (0.040) (0.023)
Exogenous Treatment (Table 4 Column 2)
Comparative? -0.103*** -0.126*** 0.000 0.085*** 0.107*** 0.045**
(0.037) (0.035) (0.076) (0.031) (0.021) (0.020)
Endogenous Treatment (Table 4 Column 4)
Comparative? -0.337*** -0.434*** 0.024 0.256** 0.312** 0.165**
(0.070) (0.085) (0.243) (0.121) (0.132) (0.082)
Endogenous Treatment (Table 4 Column 5)
Comparative? -0.375*** -0.463*** 0.008 0.266* 0.377*** 0.176*
(0.110) (0.138) (0.269) (0.144) (0.100) (0.097)
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TABLE 6. Results after Controlling for Comparative Content, and Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Comparative? 0.662*** 0.476*** 1.499*** 1.576**
(0.024) (0.026) (0.174) (0.624)
Standardized sales 0.357*** 0.215*** 0.445*** 0.096 0.268*
(0.021) (0.021) (0.027) (0.073) (0.149)
Standardized sales squared -0.356*** -0.243*** -0.204*** -0.147*** -0.160**
(0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.052) (0.076)
Standardized generic sales -0.220*** -0.146*** -0.136*** -0.082** -1.571***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.043) (0.038) (0.227)
Standardized NNT -0.785*** -1.408***
(0.047) (0.239)
Relative Speed 0.260*** 0.024
(0.047) (0.142)
Standardized GI Risk -0.151*** -1.741***
(0.056) (0.241)
Standardized CV Risk -0.478*** -0.996***
(0.053) (0.173)
Residuals-Comparative -1.042*** -1.103*
(0.187) (0.624)
Residuals-Sales 0.305 0.174
(0.254) (0.288)
Residuals-Generic Sales 0.342*** 1.844***
(0.127) (0.258)
Cuto¤ (0->1 cues) -4.103***
(0.178)
Cuto¤ (1->2 cues) -1.986*** -1.654*** -1.199*** -1.222*** -1.187***
(0.025) (0.028) (0.100) (0.114) (0.277)
Cuto¤ (2->3 cues) -0.680*** -0.285*** 0.196** 0.172 0.247
(0.018) (0.023) (0.098) (0.121) (0.276)
Cuto¤ (3->4 cues) 0.091*** 0.530*** 1.054*** 1.020*** 1.134***
(0.017) (0.024) (0.099) (0.124) (0.276)
Cuto¤ (4->5 cues) 0.983*** 1.457*** 2.029*** 1.975*** 2.125***
(0.020) (0.027) (0.100) (0.126) (0.279)
Cuto¤ (5->6 cues) 1.926*** 2.424*** 3.035*** 2.992*** 3.150***
(0.035) (0.039) (0.105) (0.148) (0.294)
Log-Likelihood: 9,739 9,708 9,708 9,708 9,708
N of Observations -14165.7 -13704.1 -13378.8 -13372.3 -13138.6
note:*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. Column (4) and (5) treat "Comparative?", "Sales".
and "Generic Sales" as endogenous variables. Instruments are the same as in Table 4
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TABLE 7. Relative Rankings of Speed and Duration of Pain Relief
Time to Perceptible Pain Duration of Meaningful Time
Reliefj Relief (Longevity)
Sol Ibuprofen>Ibuprofen (1, 6) Naproxen>Aspririn (3)
Ibuprofen> Acetaminophen (1, 5, 6) Ibuprofen>Acetaminophen (2, 4, 5, 9, 10)
Acetaminophen> Naproxen (10) Ibuprofen/Sol Ib>Acetaminophen (6)
Naproxen>Aspirin (3) Naproxen>Acetaminophen (2, 4, 8, 9)
Acetaminophen>Aspirin (10)
Resulting Ranking (Highest to Lowest):
1. Soluble Ibuprofen 1. Naproxen Sodium
2. Ibuprofen 2. Ibuprofen/Soluble Ibuprofen
3. Acetaminophen 3. Acetaminophen
4. Naproxen Sodium 4. Aspirin
5. Aspirin
